We show that every black-box construction of one-time signature schemes from a random oracle achieves security at most poly(q)2 q , where q is the total number of queries to the oracle by the generation, signing, and verification algorithms. That is, any such scheme can be broken with probability close to 1 by a (computationally unbounded) adversary making poly(q)2 q queries to the oracle. This is tight up to a constant factor in the number of queries, since a simple modification of Lamport's scheme achieves 2 (0.812−o(1))q security using q queries.
Introduction
Digital signature schemes allow authentication of messages between parties without shared keys. Signature schemes pose an interesting disconnect between the worlds of theoretical and applied cryptography. From a theoretical point of view, it is natural to divide cryptographic tools into those that can be constructed using one-way functions and those that are not known to have such constructions. Signature schemes, along with private key encryption, message authentication codes, pseudorandom generators and functions, belong to the former camp. In contrast, the known constructions of public key encryption are based on structured problems that are conjectured to be hard (i.e., problems from number theory or the theory of lattices).
From a practical point of view, it is more natural to divide the tools according to the efficiency of their best known constructions. The division is actually similar, since schemes based on structured problems typically require both more complicated computations and larger key size, as they often have non-trivial attacks (e.g., because of the performance of the best known factoring algorithms, to get 2 n security based on factorization one needs to useΩ(n 3 ) long integers). Signa-ture schemes are outlier to this rule: even though they can be constructed using one-way functions, applied cryptographers consider them as relatively inefficient since practical constructions are based on structured hard problems, and thus are significantly less efficient than private key encryption, message authentication codes, pseudorandom functions etc... In particular, very high speed applications shun digital signatures in favor of message authentication codes, even though the latter sometime incur a significant cost in keeping shared private keys among the entities involved. 1 The reason is that known constructions of such schemes from one-way functions or other unstructured primitives are quite inefficient. This problem already arises in one-time signatures [22, 19, 20] , that are a relaxation of digital signatures offering security only in the case that the attacker observes at most a single valid signature. The best known constructions for this case require Ω(k) invocations of the one-way function (or even a random oracle) to achieve 2 k security. In contrast, there are known constructions of message authentication codes, private key encryptions, and pseudorandom generators and functions that use only O(1) queries to a random oracle.
In this paper, we study the question of whether there exist more efficient constructions of signature schemes from symmetric primitives such as hash functions and block ciphers. We show that to a certain extent the inefficiency of the known constructions is inherent.
Our results
We consider the efficiency of constructions of one-time signatures using black boxes / oracles that model ideal symmetric primitives: the random oracle, the random permutation oracle and the ideal cipher oracle (see Section 3 for definitions). We wish to study the security of such constructions as a function of the number of queries made to the oracle by the construction (i.e., by the generation, signing, and verification algorithms). Of course, we believe that one-time signatures exist and so there are in fact signature schemes achieving super-polynomial security without making a single query to the oracle. Hence we restrict ourselves to bounding the blackbox security of such schemes. We say that a cryptographic scheme using oracle O has black-box security S if for every T < S, a (potentially computationally unbounded) adversary that makes at most T queries to O will break the scheme with probability at most T /S (see Definition 3.2) . Our main result is the following: Theorem 1.1. Any one-time signature scheme for n-bit messages using at most q ≤ n queries to a random oracle has black-box security at most poly(q)2 q . This is in contrast to other primitives such as message authentication codes, collision resistant hash functions, privatekey encryption, and pseudorandom functions, that can all be implemented using one or two queries to a random oracle with black-box security that depends exponentially on the length of these queries.
We note that Theorem 1.1 is tight up to a constant factor in the number of queries, since a simple modification of Lamport's scheme [19] yields 2 (0.812−o(1))q security (see Section 5).
We also prove several extensions of the main result:
Other oracles Since our goal is to find out whether signatures can be efficiently constructed from symmetric primitives, it makes sense to study also other primitives than the random oracle. Theorem 1.1 extends (with a loss of a constant factor in the number of queries) to the ideal cipher oracle and random permutation oracle that are also sometimes used to model the idealized security of symmetric primitives such as block-ciphers and one-way permutations. Implementing adversary in BPP NP The proof of Theorem 1.1 shows that for every q-query one-time signature scheme, there is an adversary that breaks it with probability 1 − o(1) using at most poly(q)2ueries. However, the running time of this adversary can be higher than that. This is inherent, as otherwise we'd be proving unconditionally the non-existence of one-time signature schemes. However, we show that this adversary can be implemented in probabilistic polynomial-time using an oracle to an NP-complete problem. Thus, similar to what Impagliazzo and Rudich [16] showed for keyexchange, if there were a more efficient construction of signature schemes from random oracles with a proof of security relying on the adversary's efficiency, then this is also a proof that P = NP. Imperfect completeness While the standard definition of signature schemes requires the verifier to accept valid signatures with probability 1, one can also consider relaxed variants where the verifier has some small positive probability of rejecting even valid signatures. We say that such signature schemes satisfy imperfect completeness. We can extend Theorem 1.1 to this case, though to get an attack succeeding with high probability we lose a quadratic factor in the number of queries.
Efficiency of the verifier Because the signing and the verification are executed more often than the key generation, it makes sense to study their efficiency separately rather than just considering the total number of queries. We show that there is a tradeoff between the number of queries asked by the verification algorithm and the total number of queries. That is, although by simple modifications of the Lamport's scheme (see Section 5) one can get arbitrary large security using even three queries in the verification, we show this inherently comes at a high cost in the total number of queries. In particular, if the verifier asks at most v queries and q is the total number of queries, then there is an adversary asking at most O(q 2 q v ) queries who breaks the system with probability close to 1.
Note on the random oracle model. Although the random oracle model [3] (and its cousin the ideal cipher model) is frequently used as an idealization of the properties enjoyed by certain constructions such as the SHA-1 hash function [21] and the AES block cipher [8] , it has drawn a lot of criticism as this idealization is not generally justified [7] . However, for the sake of lower bounds (as is our concern here) this idealization seems appropriate, as it is a clean way to encapsulate all the attractive properties that could be obtained by constructions such as SHA-1,AES, etc..
Taxonomy of black-box reductions. Reingold, Trevisan
and Vadhan [23] study various notions of "black-boxness" of security proofs in cryptography according to whether a construction of a cryptographic tool based on an underlying primitive uses this primitive as a black box, and whether its security proof uses the adversary as a black box. In their notations, we give a lower bound on the number of queries that fully blackbox constructions of one-time signatures make to various ideal oracles, and also show that if P = NP then this bound holds for semi black-box constructions as well (those that use the code of the adversary and the fact that it is efficient). We note that if one-way functions exist, then there do exist semi blackbox constructions making no query of a random oracle. We also note that there do exist cryptographic constructions that use the primitive [15, 14] or the adversary [1] in a non-blackbox way, but at the moment all of the known highly efficient cryptographic constructions (e.g., those used in practice) are black box, in the sense that if they use a generic underlying primitive (i.e., not based on specific problems such as factoring) then it's used as a black-box and if they have a proof of security then the proof treats the adversary as a black box.
Prior work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first lower bound on the number of random oracle queries needed to construct signature schemes. Starting with the seminal paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich [16] , that showed that there is no construction of a key exchange protocol from a random oracle with a blackbox proof of security, several works have investigated the existence of black-box security proofs reducing one kind of cryptographic scheme to another. However, only few works studied the efficiency of such constructions [18, 11] . Of these, the most relevant is the paper by Gennaro, Gertner, Katz and Trevisan [11] . They considered the efficiency of basing various cryptographic primitives on one-way permutations (OWP) secure against S-sized circuits, and proved that to achieve superpolynomial security (1) pseudorandom generators with bits of stretch require Ω( / log S) invocations of the OWP, (2) universal one-way hash functions compressing their input by bits require Ω( / log S) invocations, (3) private key encryption schemes for messages of length n with key length k require Ω((n−k)/ log S) invocations, and (most relevant for us) (4) one-time signature schemes for length n messages require Ω(n/ log S) invocations.
However, the one-way permutation oracle used by [11] was very far from being a random oracle. 2 Indeed, the applications (1), (2) , and (3) can be implemented using only a constant number of calls to a random oracle, and correspondingly are considered to have efficient practical implementations. Thus, [11] left open the question of whether signature schemes can be efficiently constructed from efficient symmetric key primitives such as hash functions and block ciphers. It is this question that we are concerned with in this paper. Thus, on a technical level our work is quite different from [GGKT] (as we work with a random oracle and cannot "tamper" with it to prove our lower bound) and in fact is more similar to the techniques in the original work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [16] .
This work partially answers a question of [11] , as it implies that any construction of super-polynomially secure onetime signatures from one-way permutation with Ω(n) hardcore bits requires at least ω(log n) invocations.
Several works [20, 9, 24, 4, 5] considered generalizations of Lamport's one-time signature scheme. Some of these achieve shorter keys and signatures, although the relation between the number of queries and security is the same as Lamport's scheme up to a constant factor.
Our techniques
We now give a high level overview of the ideas behind the proof of Theorem 1.1. Our description ignores several subtle issues, and the reader is referred to Section 4 for the full proof.
To understand the proof of the lower bound, 3 it is instructive to review the known upper bounds and in particular the simple one-time signature scheme of Lamport [19] . To sign messages of length n with security parameter using a random 2 They considered an oracle that applies a random permutation on the first t bits of its n-bit input, for t n, and leaves the rest of the n − t bits unchanged. This is a one-way permutation with 2 Ω(t) security. 3 We use the terms "lower bound" and "upper bound" in their traditional crypto/complexity meaning of negative results vs. positive results. Of course one can view Theorem 1.1 as either upper-bounding the security or lowerbounding the number of queries.
oracle O (that we model as a random function from {0, 1} to {0, 1} ) the scheme works as follows:
• Generate the public verification key V K by choosing 2n
This scheme uses 3n queries. Using the fact that a random oracle is a one-way function one can show that it has 2 Ω( ) security. Note that in this case the security is can be arbitrarily large independently of the number of queries. Indeed, to prove Theorem 1.1 we need to assume that the number queries q is somewhat smaller than the length of the messages. Lamport's scheme can be easily modified to have this property by following the hash-and-sign paradigm: first use the random oracle to hash the message to length k, and then apply Lamport's scheme to the hashed value. This will result in a scheme with 3k + 2 queries and (by the birthday bound) 2 k/2 security (see Section 5 for some improvements). We see that now indeed the security is bounded by 2 O(q) (where q is the number of queries), regardless of the length of these queries.
The above discussion shows that to prove Theorem 1.1, we will need to use the fact that there is a large number of potential messages, which is indeed what we do. Note that the reason that the hash-and-sign variant of Lamport's scheme only achieves 2 k/2 security is that if a pair of messages α, β satis-
denotes the first k bits of O(x)) then they have the same signature, and so a signature for α allows an adversary to forge a signature on β. We will try to generalize this observation to arbitrary signature schemes. For every such scheme S and two messages α, β we will say that "α is useful for β" if they satisfy a certain condition. Then (roughly speaking) we will prove that: (A) if α is useful for β then a signature on α can be used to compute a signature on β without too many additional oracle queries and (B) if α and β are chosen at random then α will be useful for β with probability at least 2 −q (where q is the total number of queries made by the scheme S). Together (A) and (B) imply that, as long as the space of possible messages is large enough, then the black-box security of S is bounded by O(2 q ), since the adversary can choose random messages α, β, ask for a signature on α and use that to forge a signature on β with probability 2 −q . 4 DEFINING THE USEFULNESS CONDITION. This proof strategy rests of course on the ability to find an appropriate condition "α is useful for β" for every one-time signature scheme S. This is what we describe now. We will assume that only the key generation algorithm of S is probabilistic, and that both the signing and verification algorithms are deterministic (it turns out this is without loss of generality). For every fixed randomness of the generation algorithm, fixed oracle, and message α, we define G, S α and V α to be the sets of queries made by the generation algorithm, signing algorithm and verification algorithm (respectively) where the last two are applied on the message α.
First attempt. Observe that in the hash-and-sign variant of Lamport's scheme, α and β have the same signature iff V α = V β . This motivates stipulating for every signature scheme that α is useful for β if V β ⊆ V α . This definition satisfies Property (A) above: if we know all the queries that the verifier will make on a signature of β, then finding a signature that makes it accept can be done by an exponential-time exhaustive search that does not make any oracle queries at all. The problem is that it might not satisfy (B): it's easy to make the verifier ask, when verifying a signature for α, a query that uniquely depends on α, thus ensuring V β V α for every distinct α, β.
Second attempt. A natural intuition is that verifier queries that do not correspond to queries made by the generation algorithm are sort of "irrelevant"-after all, in Lamport's scheme all the queries the verifier makes are a subset of the queries made by the generation algorithm. Thus, we might try to de-
Since G has at mostueries, and so at most 2 q subsets, this definition satisfies Property (B) (i.e., if α and β are random then α will be useful for β with probability at least 2 −q ). Unfortunately, it does not satisfy Property (A): there is a signature scheme for which every pair of messages α, β satisfies this condition even when a signature for α cannot be used to forge a signature on β. 5 Our actual condition. The condition we actually use is that
Using Bollobás's Inequality [6] (see the proof of Claim 4.6) it can be shown that this condition satisfies Property (B). The reason that it satisfies Property (A) becomes clear after going over the description of the actual attack (see the proof of Theorem 4.1), and it turns out to be the natural condition needed for the attack to succeed. The proof uses a careful hybrid argument, showing that this condition can be used by an attacker to forge signatures. It relies on the fact that the result of each query to a random oracle is independent of other queries (though we are able to extend it to the ideal cipher model). It also assumes that no particular query is asked by the algorithms of the signature scheme with too high of a probability. To handle the case in which some queries are heavy, the attacker uses a learning algorithm to learn all the "heavy" queries that are asked with relatively high probability. 5 Such an example can be obtained by the variant of Lamport's scheme where each signer uses the verification key V K to sign a new verification key V K (the randomness for which is part of the secret key), and then signs the message using the secret key corresponding to V K . In this case Vα ∩ G = V β ∩G for every pair α, β, even if a signature on α cannot be used to compute a signature on β.
Preliminaries
We define the notion of one-time signature schemes and their black-box security. We specialize our definition to the case that the signature schemes use an oracle O that may also be chosen from some probability distribution. We use the standard notation A O (x) to denote the output of an algorithm A on input x with access to oracle O. Definition 3.1. A signature scheme (with perfect completeness) for n bit messages is a triplet of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial-time oracle algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver) with the following property: for every oracle O, if (SK, V K) is a pair that is output by Gen O (1 n ) with positive probability, then for every α ∈ {0, 1} n , Ver O (V K, α, Sign O (SK, α)) = 1 with probability one. We call SK the signing key and V K the verification key.
One can also make a relaxed requirement that the verification algorithm only needs to accept valid signatures with probability 0.9 (where this probability is over the verifier's coins only). We say that such relaxed signature schemes have imperfect completeness, and we will consider such schemes in Section 6.
Note that we consider signature algorithms on a finite set of messages. For upper bounds one would want uniform efficient algorithms that could handle any size of message, but for a lower bound, this simpler definition will do.
The definition of security we use is the following: This is a slightly weaker definition of security than the standard definition, since we are not allowing the adversary to choose the message α based on the public key. However, this is again fine for lower bounds (the known upper bounds do satisfy the stronger definition). Also, some texts use 1/S (rather than T /S) as the bound on the success probability. Security according to either one of these definitions is always at most quadratically related, but we feel Definition 3.2 is more precise.
Oracles. We will consider schemes that use one of the following oracles: (1) The random oracle returns on input x ∈ {0, 1} n the value f (x) where f is a random function from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . 6 (2) The random permutation oracle returns on input x ∈ {0, 1} n the value f (x) where f is a random
where for every k ∈ {0, 1} n , f k is a random permutation on {0, 1} (n) . These three oracles are standard idealizations of (respectively) hash functions, one-way permutations and block ciphers.
Proof of the main result
Theorem 1.1 is a corollary of the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Let (Gen, Sign, Ver) be a one-time signature scheme (with perfect completeness) for length n messages, in which the total number of oracle queries asked by Gen, Sign, and Ver is q, for q ≤ n. Then, there is a (computationally unbounded) adversary which asks at most poly(q)2 q oracle queries and breaks the scheme with probability 1−o(1), where o(1) is a term tending to zero with q.
We now turn to proving Theorem 4.1. We assume that (1) only Gen is probabilistic, and Sign and Ver are deterministic, and (2) all the queries made to the oracle are of the same length, which we denote by . These assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity only, and one can straightforwardly generalize the proof to hold without them. THE ADVERSARY'S ALGORITHM. To prove Theorem 4.1, we need to show an adversary, which we denote by Adv, that breaks the signature scheme with high probability using poly(q)2ueries to the oracle (though perhaps with larger running time). Our adversary Adv will operate as follows:
Input: Key generation. The adversary receives a verification key V K, where (V K, SK) = Gen(1 n ).
Step 1: Request signature. Let N = 2 q and let β 0 , . . . , β N −1 denote the first N distinct messages (in lexicographic order) in {0, 1} n . Let α 0 , . . . , α N −1 be a random permutation of β 0 , . . . , β N −1 . Adv asks for a signature on α 0 and verifies it (note that α 0 is chosen independently of the public key). We denote the obtained signature by σ 0 . We denote by T 0 the transcript of this step, which includes the random tape of the generation algorithm, all the queries made by the generation, signing, and verification algorithms, and the answers to these queries. (Note that Adv only has partial information on T 0 .)
Step 2: Learning query/answer pairs. We denote by L 0 the information that Adv currently has on the oracle O and the randomness of the generation algorithm: that is, L 0 consists of V K, σ 0 and the queries made by the verifying algorithm Ver on input V K, σ 0 , along with the answers to these queries. Let = 1 q 2 N , δ = 1 q , and M = q δ = q 4 2 q . For i = 1, . . . , M , do the following:
1. Let D i−1 be the distribution on all transcripts T 0 of the first step, conditioned on knowing L i−1 .
2. We let Q(L i−1 ) denote the queries appearing in L i−1 . If there exists a string x ∈ {0, 1} \ Q(L i−1 ) that is queried with probability at least in D 0 then Adv lets L i be L i−1 concatenated with the query/answer pair (x i , O(x i )), where x i is the lexicographically first such string. Otherwise, L i = L i−1 .
Step 3: Sampling a possible transcript. Adv generates a random transcriptT 0 according to the distribution D M . Note thatT 0 also determines a secret signing key, which we denote bySK (SK may or may not equal the "true" signing key SK).T 0 may also determine some query/answer pairs that were not in L M , and hence may not agree with the the actual answers of the "true" oracle O. We denote byÕ the oracle that on input x, if x appears as a query inT 0 thenÕ(x) outputs the corresponding answer, and otherwiseÕ(x) = O(x).
Step 4: Forging. For every j = 1, . . . , N − 1, Adv usesSK and the oracleÕ to compute a signature on the message α j , which it then tries to verify this time using V K and the "true" oracle O. Adv outputs the first signature that passes verification.
ANALYSIS. The number of queries asked during the attack is at most M + N q = q 4 2 q + q2 q = poly(q)2 q . To analyze the success probability of Adv we will prove the following lemma: Note that the event E j roughly corresponds to the condition that "α 0 is useful for α j " described in Section 2. Lemma 4.2 implies Theorem 4.1 since if the event E j holds then when verifying the signature for α j , the verifier never asks a query on which the oracles O andÕ differ (these oracles can differ only on queries in (G ∪S 0 ) \ V 0 ). But if the verifier uses the same oracleÕ used by the generation and signing algorithm, then by the definition of a signature scheme, it must accept the signature.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
It turns out that using known combinatorial techniques, one can show that ∪ j E j holds with high probability if all signatures and verifications were to use the "true" oracle O and signing key SK (as opposed toÕ andSK). The idea behind the proof is to show this holds in our case using a hybrid argument. Specifically, we define four distributions H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , where H 0 corresponds to the transcript (queries, answers, and randomness) of the attacker Adv, and H 3 corresponds to the transcript where all signatures and verifications use the "true" oracle and signing key. We will prove the lemma by showing that the probability of ∪ j E j is almost the same in all these four distributions.
Definition of hybrid distributions. The four hybrid distributions H 0 , .., H 3 are defined as follows:
H 0 : This is the distribution ofT 0 , T 1 , . . . , T N −1 , whereT 0 denotes the transcript sampled by Adv in Step 3, while T j (for j ≥ 1) denotes the transcript of the j th signature (i.e., the queries and answers of the signing and verification algorithms on α j ) as generated by Adv in Step 4. H 1 : This is the same distribution as H 0 , except that now in
Step 4 the adversary uses the modified oracleÕ for both signing and verifying the signatures on α 1 , . . . , α N −1 (recall that in H 0 the oracleÕ is only used for signing). H 2 : This is the same distribution as H 1 , except that we make a slight modification in the definition ofÕ: for every query x that was asked by the generation and signing algorithms in the Input step and Step 1 (i.e., for every query in T 0 ), we answer with O(x) only if x also appears in L M . Otherwise, we answer this query with a completely random value. H 3 : This is the same distribution as H 2 except now we use the "true" oracle and signing key for all signatures. In other words, this is the transcript (randomness and all query/answer pairs) of the following experiment: (1) Generate signing and verification keys (SK, V K) using a random oracle O (2) for j = 0 . . . N − 1, sign α j and verify the signature using SK, V K and O.
Lemma 4.2 follows immediately from the following claims:
Claim 4.4. The statistical distance of H 1 and H 2 is at most 2/q. Thus,
Proof of Claims 4.3 to 4.6
We now complete the proof of Lemma 4.2 by proving Claims 4.3 to 4.6.
Proof. By the inclusion-exclusion expression for ∪ j≥1 E j , it suffices to prove that for every J ⊆ [1..N − 1],
The event ∩ j∈J E j depends only on Adv's actions while signing and verifying the messages α 0 , and α j for j ∈ J. But recall that the only difference between H 0 and H 1 is that in H 1 the signatures for α 1 , . . . , α N are verified usingÕ instead of O, and these two oracles only differ on the queries that are part of the transcriptT 0 but were not learned before by Adv. Thus in particular, for every j ≥ 1, as long as while verifying the j th signature, Adv does not make a query in (G ∪S 0 ) \ V 0 (i.e., as long as the event E j is not violated), Adv's behavior in H 0 and H 1 is identical. It follows that
Claim 4.4 (Restated). The statistical distance of H 1 and H 2 is at most 2/q. Thus,
Proof. The statistical distance between H 1 and H 2 is bounded by the probability of the event B that Adv asks a query in Q(T 0 ) \ Q(L M ), where we use Q(T ) to denote the queries made in the transcript T . Indeed, as long as B doesn't happen then H 1 and H 2 are identical. This also implies that the probability of B is the same in both distributions.
Let , δ and M be as in Step 2 of Adv: = 1 q 2 2 q , δ = 1/q, and M = q δ = q 4 2 q . We start by showing:
where D i is defined, as in Step 2 of Adv, to be the distribution of the transcript of the first signature conditioned on the information in L i . PROOF OF (1) . For every possible query x to the random oracle, let q x denote the probability, taken over both the random oracle and the randomness used by Gen and Adv, that x is queried when generating a key and then signing and verifying α 0 . Then x q x ≤ q (*) since this sum is the expected number of queries in this process. Let p x denote the probability that x is learned at some iteration of Step 2. Then, q x ≥ p x (**). Indeed, if A i is the event that x is learned at the i th iteration, then since these events are disjoint q
But by definition of the learning process , Pr[x is queried|A i ] ≥ and hence q x ≥ M i=1 Pr[A i ] = p x . But the event in (1) only occurs if M distinct queries are learned in Step 2. Hence, if it happens with probability more than δ then the expected number of queries learned, which is x p x , is larger than δM . Yet combining (*) and (**), we get that δM <
x p x ≤
x q x / ≤ q/ , contradicting the fact that M = q/( δ).
Now, Adv makes all its operations in
Step 4 based solely on the information in L M , and as long as B doesn't happen, the answers to all queries not appearing in L M are simply chosen at random. Thus, instead of thinking of T 0 being chosen first, then L M computed and then all queries of Step 4 being performed, we can think of L M being chosen first, then Adv runs Step 4 based on L M , and then T 0 is chosen according to the distribution D M . But since at most qN = q2ueries are made in Step 4, by (1) with probability 1 − δ if T 0 is chosen from D M then the probability that Q(T 0 ) \ Q(L M ) contains one of these queries is at most q2 q = 1/q. Thus, B happens with probability at most 2/q.
Proof. The only information used in H 2 about the original transcript T 0 is the verification key and the signature. But these are also the same in the sampled transcriptT 0 . Therefore, we can think of H 2 as the following experiment: (1) choose the verification key, signature σ 0 , (2) choose a transcriptT 0 consistent with these, (3) choose random values for the oracleÕ on queries not appearing inT 0 , and (4) compute and verify signatures on α 1 , . . . , α N −1 using these keys and oracle. In fact, rather than thinking of the verification key and signature as being chosen first andT 0 later, we can think of the keys and signature as being chosen in the normal way: first we choose a random oracleÕ, then we use the generation algorithm to obtain a key pair, and then we compute the signature on α 0 using the signing key.
We see that H 2 is equivalent to the distribution of the transcript of the following experiment: choose random oracleÕ, use it to generate signing and verification keys, and then use these to sign and verify messages α 0 , . . . , α N −1 . This is the same as H 3 (except there we denote the random oracle by O instead ofÕ).
Proof. We will prove this holds for every fixed oracle and randomness of all parties, as long as the permutation α 0 , . . . , α N −1 is chosen at random. For every fixing of the oracle and randomness and j ∈ [0..N − 1], let S j denote the set of queries made by either the generation algorithm or the signing algorithm on input the signing key and the message β j , and let V j be the set of queries made by the verification algorithm while verifying this signature. The proof will follow from this fact: COMBINATORIAL LEMMA: If S 1 , . . . , S K , V 1 , . . . , V K are subsets of some universe satisfying |S i | + |V i | ≤ q and S i ∩ V j V i for every i = j then K ≤/2 . The Combinatorial Lemma immediately implies Claim 4.6. Indeed, for every i, j with i = j, define the event E i,j to hold if S i ∩ V j ⊆ V i . Then, there must be at least N −/2 = N − o(N ) i's such that E i,j holds for some j (otherwise we could remove all of them and obtain a larger than/2 -sized family contradicting the combinatorial Lemma). But, if we choose a permutation α 0 , . . . , α N −1 such that α 0 = β i for such an i then the event ∪ j E j holds.
Thus, all that is left is to prove the combinatorial lemma. It essentially follows from Bollobás's Inequality [6] but we repeat the argument here. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a family S 1 , . . . , S K , V 1 , . . . , V K satisfying conditions of the lemma with K >/2 . First, we can remove any elements from S i that are also in V i , since it will not hurt any of the conditions. Note that this means that for every i, j, V i ∩ S j = ∅ iff i = j. Now, take a random ordering of the universe and let A i be the event that all the members of S i occur before the members of V i in this order. The probability of A i is |Si|!|Vi|! (|Si|+|Vi|)! = 1/ |Si|+|Vi| |Si| ≥ 1/ q |Si| ≥ 1//2 . Hence if K >/2 there is a positive probability that both A i and A j hold for some i = j. But in this case it's not hard to see that either S i and V j are disjoint or S j and V i are disjoint, contradicting our hypothesis.
A One-Time Signature Scheme
The following Theorem shows that Theorem 1.1 is tight up to a constant factor in the number of queries.
Theorem 5.1. For every n, q there is a signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Ver) using a total ofueries to a random oracle that is 2 (0.812−o(1))q -one time secure (by o(1) we mean a term tending to 0 with q).
Proof. The scheme is basically Lamport's Scheme [19] with two changes: (1) we use a more efficient anti-chain (family of incomparable sets) than Lamport's scheme (a well-known optimization)and (2) we use a secret "salt" value for the hash function to prevent a birthday attack. • Let h(α) be the first log k ck bits of O(z, α), which we identify with a ck-sized subset of [k] . The signature of α consists of {x i } i∈h(α) and the string z.
• To verify a signature, check that the released strings are indeed preimages of the corresponding entries of the public key, and that they correspond to h(α).
The number of queries is q = (1 + c)k + 4, while the security is at least
is the Shannon entropy function.
The proof of security is as follows. Let T be the total number of oracle queries asked by the adversary. If the adversary chooses α 1 , α 2 such that h(α 1 ) = h(α 2 ), then in order to break the system she needs to guess one of the x i 's which was not revealed to her in the signature of α 1 . The probability of doing such for any specific i is at most (T + 1)/2 q . By union bound, her chance of breaking the system conditioned on h(α 1 ) = h(α 2 ) is at most k(T + 1)/2 q = O(T / k ck ). On the other hand, with probability at least 1 − T /2 q > 1 − T / k ck , the adversary does not ask an oracle query z such that O(z ) = O(z) before she receives the signature of α 1 . So we can assume that during the signing of α 1 , h(α 1 ) is chosen totally at random, independently of what the adversary has done so far. Therefore the chance of the adversary of finding α 2 such that h(α 2 ) = h(α 1 ) is at most (T + 1)/ k ck . Hence, her total chance of breaking the system is O(T / k ck ).
Extensions
We can prove several extensions of Theorem 1.1.
OTHER ORACLES. Using minor changes to the proof of Theorem 4.1 we can get a similar lower bound for signature schemes based on the ideal cipher or a random permutation oracles. This is important as these oracles are also sometimes used to model highly efficient symmetric-crypto primitives, and so it is an interesting question whether such oracles can be used to construct signatures more efficiently. We did not try to optimize the exponent 20q in Theorem 6.1.
Proof idea. The proof for the ideal cipher oracle is more challenging than random permutations, and we explain how to handle this case. The crucial property of the random oracle used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is that the answer at every point is computed using independent randomness from the answer at all other points. This is no longer true in the ideal-cipher oracle since (1) if y is the answer for the query (k, x, F) then x must be the answer for (k, y, B) and (2) it cannot be the case that O(k, x, F) = O(k, x , F) for some x = x . We handle (1) by stipulating that all algorithms, when making a query of the form (k, x, F), will make also the redundant query (k, y, B) and vice versa. This increases the number of queries by at most a factor of 2 but now allows us to answer all queries using independent randomness. Issue (2) is not a problem if the space of possible x's is large enough (say at least 2 10q ) since then we can approximate the random permutation by a random function. But if the space is smaller than 2 10q then the adversary can simply query all of these points, hence making the oracle meaningless. IMPLEMENTING ADVERSARY IN BPP NP . Using an NP oracle our adversary can run in time poly(n, 2 q ), where n is the length of messages to be signed and we assume all algorithms run in time polynomial in n. That is, we prove the following lemma: Lemma 6.2. The adversary of the proof of Theorem 4.1 can be implemented in poly(n, 2 q ) time using an oracle to an NPcomplete problem. Lemma 6.2 can be interpreted as saying that a proof of stronger security of a signature scheme than the bounds provided by Theorem 4.1 will necessarily imply a proof that P = NP.
Proof idea. Adv uses its unbounded computational power to sample elements from certain distributions, and find strings that are "heavy" with respect to these distributions. It turns out these tasks can be performed using the works on sampling witnesses with NP oracle [17, 2] . HANDLING IMPERFECT COMPLETENESS While the typical definition of a signature scheme stipulates that a valid signature (generated by the signing algorithm with the correct key) should be accepted with probability one, it makes sense to consider (especially in the context of negative results) also signatures where the verifier may reject such signatures with small probability, say 1/10. We are able to extend our result to this case as well: Theorem 6.3. For every one-time signature scheme with imperfect completeness using a total q ≤ √ n/20 queries to a random oracle there is (1) an adversary making poly(q)2ueries that breaks the scheme with probability 2 −q and (2) adversary making 2 O(q 2 ) oracle queries that breaks the scheme with probability 0.8.
Proof Idea. The proof of Theorem 4.1 easily extends to show (1): one can show that the adversary Adv of that proof will obtain a collection 2 q signatures such that for every fixing of the verifier's random tape, one of these signatures will be accepted, implying that if we choose a signature at random it will be accepted with probability 2 −q . However, this is somewhat unsatisfying for a lower bound, since arguably an attack that succeeds with very small probability is much less devastating than an attack that succeeds with probability close to 1. To prove (2) we need to use a more careful argument (and lose a quadratic factor), applying the combinatorial lemma to the sets of queries that are "heavy" (asked with probability at least 1/(10q)) by the verifier, and using a smaller value of in Step 2 of the attack.
We note that the combination of all the above extensions holds as well (e.g., we can implement in BPP NP an adversary that breaks any signature scheme with imperfect completeness that is based on the ideal cipher).
EFFICIENCY OF THE VERIFIER Because the signing and verification algorithms are run more often than the key generation, lower bounds on their own efficiency is still meaningful. In Section 5 we saw that the signing algorithm can be very efficient while the total number of queries was almost optimal. Here we show that if we want to get an efficient verifier and exponential security at the same time, it makes the total number of queries to be inefficient. Theorem 6.4. For every one-time signature scheme with total q oracle queries, if the verification asks at most v, v ≤ q/2 oracle queries, then for any d ∈ N there is an adversary asking at most 2d 3 q 2 q v queries that breaks the scheme with probability at least 1 − 3/d.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 4.1 after setting N = d q v , = 1 dqN , δ = 1 d , and M = q δ . The total number of queries will be at most M + N q < 2d 3 q 2 q v . Note that for any v, k ∈ N, 1 ≤ v ≤ k the scheme of Section 5 can be simply changed to get a scheme in which the verifier asks v + 2 queries by revealing v-sizes subsets of x i 's as the signature rather than ck-sized ones. The security of the new scheme is Ω( k v ).
Conclusions and open questions.
We believe that lower bounds of this form-the efficiency of constructing various schemes using black box idealized primitives-can give us important information on the efficiency and optimality of various constructions. In particular, three natural questions related to this work are:
• Can one pinpoint more precisely the optimal number of queries in the construction of one-time signature schemes based on random oracles? In particular, perhaps our lower bound can be improved to show that the variant of Lamport's scheme given in Section 5 is optimal up to lower order terms. • Can we obtain a 2 O(q) -query attack succeeding with high probability against signature schemes with imperfect completeness? • Are there stronger bounds for general (not one-time) signatures? A plausible conjecture is that obtaining a t-time signature with security s requires Ω(log s log t) queries.
